Publications Partially Reconfigurable Platforms
Devil-in-FPGA: Coherent Trojans in Reconfigurable Heterogeneous Systems
42nd IEEE Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC 2026), December 2026, Los Angeles, CA, USA To appear
Abstract
Given the demands of the modern technological landscape, the rate of change in specialized hardware is everincreasing. However, the manufacturing industry witnesses the capital-intensive demand for heterogeneous acceleration on top of an already complex quest for optimizing tradeoffs between high performance, security, and efficiency. The heterogeneous acceleration mandates support for various clusters, e.g., GPUs, NPUs, TPUs, and FPGAs, empowered with inter-cluster coherence. This introduces yet another dimension that promotes the flexible deployment of customized hardware models, whose impact on overall system security remains uncertain. This paper exposes the potential threat of integrating latent trojans hidden within custom hardware into the coherence system. Notably, by acknowledging the necessity to maintain a consistent unified memory view between processing elements, we showcase how current coherence mechanisms lack a systematic design compatible with tightly integrated PEs and why security can be overlooked in favor of performance. We first recognize the gravity of the challenge arising from the need for multi-vendor integration in which hardware modules are often regarded as black boxes designed by third parties. Next, we categorize the fundamental operations that can be performed by a malicious hardware trojan with access to the coherence subsystem. We then introduce a flexible framework to define, implement, and demonstrate coherent trojans on commercially available platforms with cache-coherent FPGAs. We demonstrate that such trojans can carry out stealth attacks to break confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
Code and hardware artifacts
Cite this paper
@inproceedings{DevilFPGA_ACSAC26,
title = {{Devil-in-FPGA: Coherent Trojans in Reconfigurable Heterogeneous Systems}},
author = {Rodrigues, Cristiano and Roozkhosh, Shahin and Pinto, Sandro and Mancuso, Renato},
booktitle = {42nd IEEE Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC 2026)},
year = 2026,
month = dec,
address = {Los Angeles, CA, USA},
url = {https://cs-people.bu.edu/rmancuso/files/papers/DevilFPGA_ACSAC26.pdf}
}
TY - CONF AU - Rodrigues, Cristiano AU - Roozkhosh, Shahin AU - Pinto, Sandro AU - Mancuso, Renato TI - Devil-in-FPGA: Coherent Trojans in Reconfigurable Heterogeneous Systems T2 - 42nd IEEE Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC 2026) PY - 2026 DA - 2026/12// CY - Los Angeles, CA, USA AB - Given the demands of the modern technological landscape, the rate of change in specialized hardware is everincreasing. However, the manufacturing industry witnesses the capital-intensive demand for heterogeneous acceleration on top of an already complex quest for optimizing tradeoffs between high performance, security, and efficiency. The heterogeneous acceleration mandates support for various clusters, e.g., GPUs, NPUs, TPUs, and FPGAs, empowered with inter-cluster coherence. This introduces yet another dimension that promotes the flexible deployment of customized hardware models, whose impact on overall system security remains uncertain. This paper exposes the potential threat of integrating latent trojans hidden within custom hardware into the coherence system. Notably, by acknowledging the necessity to maintain a consistent unified memory view between processing elements, we showcase how current coherence mechanisms lack a systematic design compatible with tightly integrated PEs and why security can be overlooked in favor of performance. We first recognize the gravity of the challenge arising from the need for multi-vendor integration in which hardware modules are often regarded as black boxes designed by third parties. Next, we categorize the fundamental operations that can be performed by a malicious hardware trojan with access to the coherence subsystem. We then introduce a flexible framework to define, implement, and demonstrate coherent trojans on commercially available platforms with cache-coherent FPGAs. We demonstrate that such trojans can carry out stealth attacks to break confidentiality, integrity, and availability. ER -
%0 Conference Paper %A Rodrigues, Cristiano %A Roozkhosh, Shahin %A Pinto, Sandro %A Mancuso, Renato %T Devil-in-FPGA: Coherent Trojans in Reconfigurable Heterogeneous Systems %B 42nd IEEE Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC 2026) %D 2026 %C Los Angeles, CA, USA %X Given the demands of the modern technological landscape, the rate of change in specialized hardware is everincreasing. However, the manufacturing industry witnesses the capital-intensive demand for heterogeneous acceleration on top of an already complex quest for optimizing tradeoffs between high performance, security, and efficiency. The heterogeneous acceleration mandates support for various clusters, e.g., GPUs, NPUs, TPUs, and FPGAs, empowered with inter-cluster coherence. This introduces yet another dimension that promotes the flexible deployment of customized hardware models, whose impact on overall system security remains uncertain. This paper exposes the potential threat of integrating latent trojans hidden within custom hardware into the coherence system. Notably, by acknowledging the necessity to maintain a consistent unified memory view between processing elements, we showcase how current coherence mechanisms lack a systematic design compatible with tightly integrated PEs and why security can be overlooked in favor of performance. We first recognize the gravity of the challenge arising from the need for multi-vendor integration in which hardware modules are often regarded as black boxes designed by third parties. Next, we categorize the fundamental operations that can be performed by a malicious hardware trojan with access to the coherence subsystem. We then introduce a flexible framework to define, implement, and demonstrate coherent trojans on commercially available platforms with cache-coherent FPGAs. We demonstrate that such trojans can carry out stealth attacks to break confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
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"publisher-place": "Los Angeles, CA, USA",
"abstract": "Given the demands of the modern technological landscape, the rate of change in specialized hardware is everincreasing. However, the manufacturing industry witnesses the capital-intensive demand for heterogeneous acceleration on top of an already complex quest for optimizing tradeoffs between high performance, security, and efficiency. The heterogeneous acceleration mandates support for various clusters, e.g., GPUs, NPUs, TPUs, and FPGAs, empowered with inter-cluster coherence. This introduces yet another dimension that promotes the flexible deployment of customized hardware models, whose impact on overall system security remains uncertain. This paper exposes the potential threat of integrating latent trojans hidden within custom hardware into the coherence system. Notably, by acknowledging the necessity to maintain a consistent unified memory view between processing elements, we showcase how current coherence mechanisms lack a systematic design compatible with tightly integrated PEs and why security can be overlooked in favor of performance. We first recognize the gravity of the challenge arising from the need for multi-vendor integration in which hardware modules are often regarded as black boxes designed by third parties. Next, we categorize the fundamental operations that can be performed by a malicious hardware trojan with access to the coherence subsystem. We then introduce a flexible framework to define, implement, and demonstrate coherent trojans on commercially available platforms with cache-coherent FPGAs. We demonstrate that such trojans can carry out stealth attacks to break confidentiality, integrity, and availability."
}
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C. Rodrigues, S. Roozkhosh, S. Pinto, and R. Mancuso, “Devil-in-FPGA: Coherent Trojans in Reconfigurable Heterogeneous Systems,” in 42nd IEEE Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC 2026), Dec. 2026.
Rodrigues, C., Roozkhosh, S., Pinto, S., & Mancuso, R. (2026). Devil-in-FPGA: Coherent Trojans in Reconfigurable Heterogeneous Systems. In 42nd IEEE Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC 2026).